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This article is written at a graduate level and emphasizes definitions, assumptions, and a transparent reasoning process. Rather than listing results, it explains why the method works and how to apply it step by step. The goal is a clear, defensible understanding suitable for assignments, exams, and projects.
Game
| L | R | |
|---|---|---|
| U | (4,1) | (0,0) |
| D | (1,0) | (2,2) |
1) Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria
Player 1 best responses: to L → U, to R → D.
Player 2 best responses: to U → L, to D → R.
The pure-strategy Nash equilibria are:
$$ (U,L) \quad\text{and}\quad (D,R). $$
2) Mixed Strategy Setup
Player 1 plays U with probability $p$. Player 2 plays L with probability $q$.
3) Indifference Conditions
Player 1
$$ \pi_1(U)=4q, \qquad \pi_1(D)=2-q. $$
$$ 4q=2-q \quad\Rightarrow\quad q^*=\frac{2}{5}. $$
Player 2
$$ \pi_2(L)=p, \qquad \pi_2(R)=2-2p. $$
$$ p=2-2p \quad\Rightarrow\quad p^*=\frac{2}{3}. $$
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
$$ p^*=\frac{2}{3}, \qquad q^*=\frac{2}{5}. $$
Expected Payoffs
$$ \pi_1^*=4q^*=\frac{8}{5}, \qquad \pi_2^*=p^*=\frac{2}{3}. $$
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Conclusion: The game has two pure-strategy equilibria and one mixed-strategy equilibrium where both players randomize.

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