This post analyzes a two-period monopolist facing linear demand and learning-by-doing cost reductions. We derive optimal output in each period, compare it to a social planner’s solution, and explore whether increasing period 1 output improves welfare. When a graduate homework solution doesn’t match the expected answer, it usually means an assumption or step was missed. Online tutoring can help you isolate the error and rebuild the solution cleanly.
This article explains the topic at a graduate level by outlining the definitions, assumptions, and a structured method for solving problems. The focus is on reasoning you can replicate and defend, not just memorizing formulas. The discussion is intended to support homework, exams, and applied graduate projects.
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1. Setup: Two-Period Monopolist with Learning-by-Doing
Inverse demand in both periods:
p(q) = a − b·q
Period 1 cost per unit:
c₁
Period 2 cost per unit (learning-by-doing):
c₂ = c₁ − m·q₁
Assume no discounting, and that a > c₁ and h > m (where h is the slope of marginal revenue).
2. (a) Monopolist’s Optimal Output in Each Period
Period 1
Revenue:
R₁(q₁) = p(q₁)·q₁ = (a − b·q₁)·q₁
Cost:
C₁(q₁) = c₁·q₁
Profit:
π₁(q₁) = R₁ − C₁ = a·q₁ − b·q₁² − c₁·q₁
First-order condition:
dπ₁/dq₁ = a − 2b·q₁ − c₁ = 0
→ q₁* = (a − c₁)/(2b)
Period 2
Cost per unit now depends on q₁:
c₂ = c₁ − m·q₁
Profit:
π₂(q₂) = a·q₂ − b·q₂² − c₂·q₂
= a·q₂ − b·q₂² − (c₁ − m·q₁)·q₂
First-order condition:
dπ₂/dq₂ = a − 2b·q₂ − c₁ + m·q₁ = 0
→ q₂* = (a − c₁ + m·q₁)/(2b)
So the monopolist’s output in period 2 depends on period 1 output.
3. (b) Social Planner’s Output and “Price = Marginal Cost”?
The planner maximizes total surplus over both periods:
W(q₁, q₂) = ∫₀^{q₁} [a − b·x] dx − c₁·q₁
+ ∫₀^{q₂} [a − b·x] dx − (c₁ − m·q₁)·q₂
Compute each integral:
W = a·q₁ − 0.5·b·q₁² − c₁·q₁
+ a·q₂ − 0.5·b·q₂² − (c₁ − m·q₁)·q₂
First-order conditions:
dW/dq₁ = a − b·q₁ − c₁ + m·q₂ = 0
→ q₁ᴾ = (a − c₁ + m·q₂)/b
dW/dq₂ = a − b·q₂ − c₁ + m·q₁ = 0
→ q₂ᴾ = (a − c₁ + m·q₁)/b
These are symmetric and interdependent. Unlike the monopolist, the planner internalizes the learning-by-doing benefit in both periods.
Does “price = marginal cost” hold?
p₁ = a − b·q₁ᴾ
MC₁ = c₁
But the planner chooses q₁ to improve future cost, so price may exceed marginal cost in period 1. Thus, “price = marginal cost” does not strictly hold — the planner trades off current efficiency for future gains.
4. (c) Should the Planner Encourage Higher Period 1 Output?
Yes. The planner sees that increasing q₁ reduces c₂, which improves period 2 welfare. The monopolist under-produces q₁ because it does not internalize the full benefit of lower future costs.
Intuition:
- Monopolist chooses q₁ to maximize π₁ + π₂, but only partially accounts for how q₁ affects c₂
- Planner fully internalizes how q₁ affects future marginal cost and consumer surplus
- Therefore, planner prefers slightly higher q₁ than monopolist
This is a classic dynamic inefficiency: the monopolist’s private incentives underweight future cost reductions.
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